Question Three. Whether Penitence as Virtue is Inflictive of a Single Penalty Only

159. Whether penitence as virtue is inflictive of only a single penalty: 160. That it is:

It inflicts a penalty as the penalty is a putting of the fault in order; but of one fault there is one penal putting in order, as there is one ordering of one disorder;     therefore etc     .

161. Again, penitence is a sort of justice, as said in the preceding question [n.112]; but justice returns equal for equal; but to one fault there can be only one equal penalty corresponding to it;     therefore etc     .

162. Again, of one virtue there is one act and one object;     therefore of penitence, which is one virtue, there is one act, namely to inflict penalty, and one object, namely the penalty inflicted.

163. On the contrary:

Joel 2.13, “Rend your garments etc     .;” James 5.16, “Confess your sins to one another;” Matthew 3.8 [Luke, 3.8], “Bring forth fruits worthy of penitence.”

164. From these the argument goes as follows, according to [Ps.]-Augustine, On True and False Penitence, ch.9 n.23, “True penitence for baptism strives to bring back innocence;” but it is not brought back save through those three things [n.163].

165. Or better as follows: penitence is punitive justice according to Divine Law; but according to Divine Law it is necessary to inflict several penalties, as is proved by the authorities [n.163];     therefore etc     .

166. Again, [Ps.]-Augustine, On True and False Penitence, chs.14-15, nn.29-31 (and it is put in Lombard’s text d.16 [ch.2 nn.1-6, as taken from Gratian, Decretum p.2 cause 33 q.3, d.5 ch.1]) - an extended authority about very many things that are required in a true penitent; and there is added: “these are the fruits of penitence;”     therefore etc     .

I. To the Question

167. It is said here that to every virtue in the appetite there corresponds a rule in the intellect, either different rules for different virtues or one rule for several virtues (about this in Ord. III d.36 nn.43-59, 72, 92, 95-100 [the opinions of Henry of Ghent and Scotus respectively]); penitence, according as it is a virtue and a certain particular justice (from the solution in the preceding question [nn.85-88, 112]), has a proper act of ‘being penitent’ in the first of the four significations set down before [nn.57, 62, 120]; therefore one must look in the intellect for a rule of the virtue, and according to that rule does an act of choice follow inflictive of one penalty or of several.

168. Now one particular rule of it is said to be naturally knowable, namely that one ought to be displeased at sin (and this would be known to an angelic intellect if an angel had been a wayfarer after commission of sin and could, consequently, have had something in his will correspondingly inclining him to this rule as regard act of avenging or displeasure). And this penitence, as also its rule, could be unformed at every stage because, if knowledge natural and fitting to human nature did not fail, it could reach knowledge of this rule at any stage and could, as a result, equally have in the will something inclining it proportionally to this rule.

169. In another way, the rule regarding detestation of sin is only known from Revelation, namely that sin is to be detested insofar as it is offensive to God or turns away from God or impedes acquisition of beatitude or insofar as it leads to final misery. And under these ideas there corresponds in the will some rule of justice, a different justice even as its rule is different.

170. To the issue at hand:

Penitence in the first way [n.168] is inflictive of only one penalty, just as its rule shows that only one penalty is to be inflicted, namely the displeasure on which sadness follows, which is a penalty single and first.

171. The second penitence [n.169] is inflictive of anything which its rule dictates, and its rule, namely the knowledge had from divine Scripture, dictates several penalties to be inflicted, which the Author of this law, whose minister the penitent is, wanted to be inflicted for purpose that he be sufficiently placated; and of such sort of penalties there are many, as is gathered from Scripture [nn163-166].

172. I say therefore to the question that penitence in the first way, as having a rule naturally known, is inflictive only of one penalty, and thereby of the sadness that is consequent to it; but penitence in the second way, namely as having a rule received from Sacred Scripture, is inflictive of several penalties, namely as many as the Legislator has in the same place revealed he wills sufficient for total expiation of guilt.

173. But an objection is made [Aquinas, Sent. IV d.14 q.1 a.2, ST IIIa q.85 a.5], that penitence in the second way is not an acquired virtue, because that for whose generation something supernatural is required is not an acquired virtue; but penitence in the second way is of this sort because the knowledge that is its rule is not natural, since it is only to be had from Revelation;     therefore etc     .

174. I reply: in all ordered teachings, both speculative and practical, and both of action and of making, the higher knows something in a way in which it cannot be known to the lower. The fact is plain from Metaphysics 1.1.980b29-982a3 and Ethics 1.1.1094a1-1906a13, and from manifest examples; because in speculative teaching the higher knows the ‘reason because of which’ where the lower knows only the ‘fact that’; and in practical teachings of action the higher intends the higher end and knows it in its proper idea; and the lower does not but only its own end; likewise in the case of the arts, when speaking of the subordinate arts, Ethics 1.5.1097a15-30.

175. As to the issue at hand, we cannot know naturally the supreme speculative truths but only from Revelation, as that ‘God is triune’ and all the truths universally that are immediate about God, as is plain in Ord. prol. nn.60-65, I d.42 n.9.

176. Similarly with practical truths, we cannot know that God in his proper idea is the end of the intellectual creature except by Revelation.

177. Similarly, if an art so excellent could be found, whose proper end would not be naturally knowable, there would be need to have knowledge of its end through Revelation.

178. Now among the virtues some that are possible for human nature can be ordered to an end under a higher idea than the knowledge of this state of life extend to: as that all things are to be abandoned for Christ’s sake, obedience in all licit things is to be for Christ, and the like. Therefore in such things there is need for directive rules known by Revelation, and such are universally all the rules of the Evangelical virtues (as poverty, chastity, and the like), because the principles or practical conclusions on which, as on their rules, these virtues rest cannot be known naturally.

179. Nor for this reason are these virtues lesser; rather are they more excellent: first because these truths are truths the more excellent the more the natural light of the wayfarer does not attain to them, and second because these truths are more certain than many other truths that the natural light of the wayfarer does attain to, because they are true with the Truth that “cannot deceive nor be deceived” [Augustine, On the Psalms ps.123 n.2]. Hence, to him who has faith that God has inspired the whole of Sacred Scripture and that he is Truth infallible - to him must whatever has been revealed by God in Scripture be more certain than what any intellect can by natural light attain to.

180. Nor from the fact that the rule of this virtue is only known from Revelation, or faith, does it follow that this appetitive virtue is not a moral virtue; because, according to the Philosopher Ethics 2.1.1103a17, 25-26, a virtue is called moral from the fact that it is generable by habit or custom. And by any knowledge at all, whether had by natural light or by faith, is the appetite able to incline frequently in accord with it and generate in itself, from the frequent action, a habit that thus inclines, which will be a habit of choice, because it is appetitive and according to right reason, though not according to natural right reason but another one more right.

181. And in this way are poverty and humility and chastity and the like moral virtues, because they are, in accord with perfect and right reason (though not purely natural right reason), generated by habit, that is, by being thus frequently elicited. Thus, on the supposition of this rule known from the Gospel ‘Do penance’ [Matthew 4.17], the will is able, by frequently eliciting an act conformed to this rule, to generate in itself a habit inclining to similar acts; and it will truly be a virtue, because consonant with right reason (indeed with the most right reason), and yet a moral virtue, because generated from habit and custom.

182. Against these points doubt arises: first, how it can be known by natural reason that some sinSc. some sin, say, against the Evangelical virtues [n.178]. For how can such a sin be known to be a sin in human acts (as opposed to acts transcending human acts) if it is not known to be so by natural reason? ¹⁸ falls under the idea of sin in human acts; second, how it can be known that sin is offensive to God; third, how it can be known that sin turns away from God; fourth, how it can be known that sin is dispositive as demerit preventive of eternal beatitude; fifth, how it can be known that sin is dispositive as demerit for final penalty.

All these doubts rest on this, that ‘none of these things seems to be knowable by natural reason’.

183. I reply: whatever be the way it is naturally knowable that sin is to be detested and punished, it is possible to obtain from that same reason a rule of penitence in the first way stated, namely as naturally knowable [n.168]; but if as supernaturally knowable, then it has for rule penitence in the second way stated [n.169].

II. To the Initial Arguments

184. To the first argument [n.160] it can be said that a penalty putting guilt per se in order can be one penalty for one fault; but when putting it in order for a second whom the fault offends, the penalty is multiple according to the will of him in relation to whom the penalty does the ordering. The fact is plain in human actions, where a penalty making satisfaction to someone offended is as great and as multiple as suffices the one offended for amends. But penitence, as a penalty subordinate to the justice of the judge, is a virtue that inflicts penalty corresponding to the will of the one offended; and it is multiple, speaking of penitence in the second way [n.169], as is plain from Scripture [n.163] where the justice of the Chief Judge in avenging fault is expressed.

185. To the second [n.161] the answer is plain from the same point, that what is equal as to the nature of the thing can be given back and yet it would not punish sufficiently, because the punishing here regards someone else, in relation to whose acceptance the punishment is done.

186. And if you argue that it is cruel if a punishment in itself sufficient is not sufficient for him - look for the response.a

a.a [Interpolated text] It can be said that all the penalties are equivalent to one perfect punishment; for attrition is often insufficient; therefore something else is required, as was said [nn.171-172].

187. As to the third [n.162] the answer is plain in the same place, in the preceding solution [nn.118], that to command is an act of penitence as virtue - and this to give command to what is, as it were, next to it about acts causative of penalty [n.90], which acts are consideration in respect of sadness and willing-against of some object. But the subsequent sadness is a remote effect, and it can well be multiplied while the act of penitence as virtue continues single; and someone can, through one act of avenging or commanding of punishment, command all the punishments corresponding in justice to this fault.